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existing law referred to was the rule of United States v. Sands,18

since at the time of the proposed 1954 amendment Gilbert had
not yet been applied by any court to a trustee in bankruptcy.' 9
That the Supreme Court in Speers was correct in its interpretation of congressional intent now seems certain in view of
the 1966 amendment to section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act.20 In
an effort to clarify the trustee's powers under the section and
erase the doubts which arose after the deletion of the words
"judgment creditor" by the 1950 amendment 2' the new section
70c explicitly provides that as of the date of bankruptcy the
trustee shall have "the rights and powers of: (1) a creditor who
obtained a judgment against the bankrupt upon the date of bankruptcy

.

. (2) a creditor who upon the date of bankruptcy ob-

tained an execution returned unsatisfied against the bankrupt
(3) a creditor who upon the date of bankruptcy obtained
a lien by legal or equitable proceedings .... ." (Emphasis add*

. .

ed.) 22 This clear grant of judgment creditor status to the trustee, in the absence of any change in the reference to "judgment
creditor" in section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code, should
erase any doubt which may have existed after Speers.
Charles Romano
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Landowner brought suit to enjoin the levee board, without
expropriation procedure, from entering upon or disturbing his
property for purposes of repairing and strengthening the levee
already situated on the land. Plaintiff contended the property
18. The Court also noted that the Gilbert case was not inconsistent with the
rule announced in Sands. Id. at 274.
19. The Court summarily disposed of the government's last argument that
70c and 6323 could not be taken to mean that the trustee should prevail over
unrecorded tax liens because such an interpretation would preclude the possibility
which appears to be contemplated by §67(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, that a
federal tax lien not perfected until after bankruptcy may nevertheless be "valid
against the trustee." The Court said: "The purpose of section 67, sub. b, insofar
as tax claims are concernel, is to protect them from section 60, . . . which permits the trustee to avoid transfers made within four months of bankruptcy. ...
It does not nullify or purport to nullify the consequences which flow from the
government's failure to file its perfected lien prior to the date when the trustee's
rights as a statutory judgment creditor attach." Id. at 278.
20. Act of July 5, 1966, 80 Stat. 269, 11 U.S.C. § 501.
21. H.R. Rep. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1966).
22. Act of July 5, 1966, 80 Stat. 269, 11 U.S.C. § 501.
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was not adjacent to a river or navigable stream and, therefore,
defendant had no right to appropriate his land. On certiorari,
the Louisiana Supreme Court, held, plaintiff's property, not
bordering a navigable river nor of riparian origin, did not owe
a servitude for levee purposes under article 665 of the Civil
Code' and could not be appropriated; but since the project for
which plaintiff's land had been taken was necessary, the property could undoubtedly be expropriated2 and plaintiff was entitled to recover the market value of his property in accordance
with expropriation laws. Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co. v.
Board of Commissioners for the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, 249 La. 508, 187 So. 2d 715 (1966).
The only statutory provision granting the public a servitude
for levees is Civil Code article 665,3 upon which the board in the
instant case based its right to appropriate. Despite the constitutional guarantee that one cannot be deprived of property except
for public purposes and then only after adequate indemnification, 4 it is well settled that appropriation under article 665, even
without just compensation, does not contravene due process. 5
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 665 (1870) : "Servitudes imposed for the public or
common utility, relate to the space which is to be left for the public use by the
adjacent proprietors on the shores of navigable rivers, and for the making and
repairing of levees, roads and other public or common works.
"All that relates to this kind of servitude is determined by laws or particular
regulations."
2. Appropriation and expropriation distinguished: The right of appropriation
exists independently of the provisions of the constitution restricting the exercise
of the power of eminent domain. Appropriation is an exercise of the police power,
and any loss sustained thereby entitles the injured party to no recompense except
the previous year's assessed valuation, which the constitution provides as a mere
gratuity. Expropriation is the exertion of the right of eminent domain, the damage entailed being compensable. Chaffe v. Trezevant, 38 La. Ann. 746 (1886);
Bass v. State, 34 La. Ann. 494 (1882). Appropriation leaves title in the owner,
to whom the right to use the land will revert in case it should no longer be
needed for public purposes, whereas expropriation conveys to the state complete
title. Wilson v. Aetna Ins. Co., 161 So. 650 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935); Wilson
v. Royal Ins. Co., 161 So. 653 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
3. See note 1 supra. The servitude is traceable to the provisions for tow
paths in articles 649 and 650 of the FRENCH CIVIL CODE. In addition, it is said
that it was impressed upon riparian lands in the original grants from the Spanish
government. Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452, 463 (1896). For an elaborate
discussion of the history of article 665 and the levee servitude, see Dickson v.
Board of Comm'rs, 210 La. 121, 26 So. 2d 474 (1946). See Hart v. Board of
Levee Comm'rs, 54 Fed. 559, 561 (E.D. La. 1893) ; Ruch v. City of New Orleans,
43 La. Ann. 275, 9 So. 473 (1891), which, though a road case, is applicable in
principle. See article in 3 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARcuIivEs, COMPILED EDITION OF
TILE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA art. 665, at 383 (1942).
4. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 497 (1870) ; U.S. CONST.
amends. V, XIV; Wolfe v. Hurley, 46 F.2d 515 (W.D. La. 1930).
5. Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896) ; Wolfe v. Hurley, 46 F.2d
.515 (W.D. La. 1930) ; Hart v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 54 Fed. 559 (E.D. La.
1893) ; Board of Comm'rs v. Franklin, 219 La. 859, 54 So. 2d 125 (1951);
Dickson v. Board of Comm'rs, 210 La. 121, 26 So. 2d 474 (1946). See The Work
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It was only in 1898 for Orleans Parish 6 and 1921 for the remainder of the state 7 that any compensation was provided for
land taken under this servitude. Flood control was becoming of
general concern and the burden on the riparian proprietor was
slightly alleviated and partially distributed throughout the state
by these constitutional changes. 8 However, compensation is
limited to the property's assessed value for the preceding year 9
and is merely a gratuity. 0
Extensive litigation has resulted from the ambiguity of
article 665. A question repeatedly presented is whether nonriparian land may be appropriated under the article. In some
of the earlier cases the courts were lenient in applying the servitude not only to property actually adjoining a navigable stream
but also to all lands "within the range of the reasonable necessity of the situation, as produced by the forces of nature unaided
by artificial causes."" In Hart v. Board of Commissioners, the
court held:
"The levees . . . having been located by the lawful authorities . . . notwithstanding their remoteness from the
natural bed of the river . . . are by statute wisely made

riparian, and subject to the levee servitude."' 12
In Board of Commissioners v. Franklin13 the Supreme Court,
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1959-1960 Term -Property,
21 LA. L.
REV. 277, 294 (1961). See Comment, 21 TUL. L. REV. 653 (1947); Note, 21
TUL. L. REV. 496 (1947).

6. LA CONST. art. 312 (1898).
7. LA. CONST. art. XVI, § 6: "Lands and improvements thereon hereafter
actually used or destroyed for levees or levee drainage purposes, . . . shall be
paid for at a price not to exceed the assessed value of the preceding year; provided, that this shall not apply to batture, nor to property the control of which
is vested in the State or any subdivision thereof for the purpose of commerce.
(Emphasis added.)
8. See discussion in Mayer v. Board of Comm'rs, 177 La. 1119, 150 So. 295
(1933). See also Dickson v. Board of Comm'rs, 210 La. 121, 26 So. 2d 474
(1946).
9. LA. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; Richardson & Bass v. Board of Levee Comm'rs,
226 La. 761, 772, 77 So. 2d 32, 35 (1954).
10. This term, often used by the courts, refers to the fact that the state is not
required by the United States Constitution to compensate for land appropriated
under the levee servitude. See Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896),
where the court quotes with approval from Ruch v. City of New Orleans, 43 La.
Ann. 275, 9 So. 473 (1891). See also United States v. General Box Co., 224 F.2d
7 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Dickson v. Board of Comm'rs, 210 La. 121, 26 So. 2d 474
(1946).
11. Wolfe v. Hurley, 46 F.2d 515 (W.D. La. 1930) ; Board of Comm'rs v.
Franklin, 219 La. 859, 54 So. 2d 125 (1951) ; Dickson v. Board of Comm'rs, 210
La. 121, 26 So. 2d 474 (1946).
12. 54 Fed. 559, 563 (E.D. La. 1893).
13. 219 La. 859, 868, 54 So. 2d 125, 128 (1951). The view expressed in the
Franklin case is to be compared with that in the later case of Hebert v. T. L.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

holding that the constitutional provisions providing compensation
extended the provisions of article 665,14 said:
"A construction of this codal article so as to apply only to
the shores of navigable streams would be too narrow and
defeat the purpose sought to be obtained." 15
These early cases indicate that under certain circumstances land
may be subject to a servitude for levee purposes, even though it
does not front on a navigable stream and was not riparian at
the time the tract was transferred from the public domain to
private ownership.
On the other hand, the courts have frequently said the servitude exists only on property actually fronting on navigable
17
rivers or streams.' 6 In Delaune v. Board of Commissioners
the court held that lands not shown to be riparian in origin
are not subjected to the servitude. Further, upon proof of the
property's riparian origin,' it must then be determined whether
James & Co., 224 La. 498, 70 So. 2d 102 (31953), where the court gave article
665 of the Civil Code a restrictive interpretation when applied to a servitude for
road purposes.
14. This assumption was shown to be unwarranted in Delaune v. Board of
Comm'rs, 230 La. 117, 127, 87 So. 2d 749, 752 (1956), where it was said
that this constitutional provision "does not and could not, for obvious constitutional reasons, burden land already separated from the public domain with
a servitude." See also Justice Hawthorne's dissent in the Franklin case, in
which he indicated that, if article 16, § 6, of the Louisiana Constitution extended the servitude of article 665, our constitutional provision could possibly
violate the provision of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution
that no state shall deprive any person of property without due process of law.
15. 219 La. 859, 868, 54 So. 2d 125, 128 (1951).
16. In Pontchartrain R.R. v. Board 'f Comm'rs, 49 La. Ann. 570, 21 So. 765
(1897), the court held that plaintiff's land, situated away from the river, did
not owe a levee servitude, although the court's opinion makes it clear that it
was necessary for such property to be taken for levee construction. See especially Koerber v. New Orleans Levee Board, 51 La. Ann. 523, 25 So. 415 (1899),
where payment of compensation was ordered for earth taken by levee board
from nearby property to broaden a protective levee which ran at right angles
to the Mississippi River, the court holding that this property was not subject
to a servitude, not being adjacent to the river. (This is almost the identical
situation which exists in the instant case.) The restrictive nature of the public
servitude was also noted in Village of Moreauville v. Boyer, 138 La. 1070, 71
So. 187 (1916) and McGeehan v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 165 La. 241, 115
So. 473 (1928).
17. 230 La. 117, 87 So. 2d 749 (1956).
18. The court explained that: "This servitude comes into existence at the
time the property bordering on the navigable stream is separated from the publie domain. Accordingly, in order to ascertain whether a particular (nonriparian) property appropriated for levee purposes is subject to a servitude,
it is essential to trace the title to the original grant." Id. at 131, 87 So. 2d at
754. (Emphasis added.) See also Board of Comm'rs for the Pontchartrain Levee
Dist. v. Baron, 236 La. 846, 109 So. 2d 441 (1959), where the court held that
land along a man-made drainage ditch which was not a navigable river or stream
and which was located over three miles from a river could not be appropriated
under the statute for levee purposes in absence of a showing that land sought
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the prope:ty taken "is within range of the reasonable necessities
of the situation, as produced by the forces of nature, unaided by
artificial causes." 19 This restrictive line of jurisprudence holds
that, despite the necessities of the situation, property cannot be
appropriated unless it is presently riparian or riparian when
20
separated from the public domain.
The instant case continues the tendency to restrict the scope
of the servitude. Although the board only sought to repair an
existing levee, a project proved to be a necessity, the court refused to apply the servitude since the land was not riparian
nor part of a riparian tract when title left the sovereign. The
board urged that "adjacent" in article 66521 does not necessarily
connote adjoining or bordering upon a navigable river, but that
it means near or close by. When property is near or close by a
navigable river, and its taking comes within the demands of a
flood control or levee project, the board argued, it owes the
servitude without regard to whether it abuts a navigable river
or has ever been part of a riparian tract. In support of this
position the board relied on Wolfe v. Hurley22 and Board of
Commissioners v. Franklin.23 Although the Wolfe case held
that under certain circumstances land, wherever located, may
owe a servitude for levee purposes regardless of its present or
prior situation in respect to a navigable stream, the court rejected the argument. 24 Instead, the court relied heavily on two
more recent cases, 25 and treated Wolfe and Franklin as standing
to be appropriated
domain.

was

riparian

property

when

separated

from

the

public

19. Board of Comm'rs v. Baron, 236 La. 846, 853, 109 So. 2d 441, 444 (1959)
Delaune v. Board of Comm'rs, 230 La. 117, 131, 87 So. 2d 749, 754 (1956). See
also A. K. Roy, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 237 La. 541, 111 So. 2d 765 (1959),
where the court held that, although the land was part of a larger tract which
was originally riparian, defendant failed to show that the purpose for which the
property was taken was "within the range of the reasonable necessities of the
situation as produced by the forces of nature unaided by artificial causes" thus the servitude not owing.
20. Delaune v. Board of Comm'rs, 230 La. 117, 87 So. 2d 749 (1956).
See
also Board of Comm'rs v. Baron, 236 La. 846, 109 So. 2d 441 (1959), where
this conclusion was specifically affirmed.
21. See note 1 supra.
22. 46 F.2d 515 (W.D. La. 1930).

23. 219 La. 859, 54 So. 2d 125 (1951).
24. The court said that the language of approval of such doctrine in Board
of Comm'rs v. Franklin, 219 La. 859, 54 So. 2d 125 (1951), appears to be dicta
inasmuch as the decision therein was based primarily on the assumption that
LA. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 (see note 7 supra), extended the provisions of article
665 (which assumption was shown to be unwarranted in Delaune v. Board of
Comm'rs, 230 La. 117, 87 So. 2d 749 (1956)).
25. Board of Comm'rs v. Baron, 236 La. 846, 109 So. 2d 441 (1959) ; Delaune

v. Board of Comm'rs, 230 La. 117, 87 So. 2d 749 (1956).
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only for the proposition that if the property is shown to have
been riparianwhen separated from the state, it can be appropriated if within range of the reasonable necessities of the situation.2e Since the levee in the instant case was already in existence the board also noted that the Supreme Court has held that
whenever an authorized state agency legally locates a levee, the
levee becomes the bank of the river or stream 27 and, thereafter,
under Civil Code article 457,28 all adjacent property becomes
29
riparian. But the court ruled that its statements were dicta
3
and had previously been denounced.
Thus the court makes it

clear that for land not bordering a navigable river to be subject
to the servitude for levee purposes it must (1) be of riparian
origin, and (2) be within range of reasonable necessities of the
situation, as produced by forces of nature, unaided by artificial
causes. Mere necessity is insufficient to invoke article 665.
It is suggested that the court's interpretation of the levee
servitude in the instant case is correct because of the nature of

the servitude itself. The constitutionality of the levee servitude
stems from the fact that the riparian property owner has always
owned his land subject to the right of the public for levees and
roads. The same holds true for non-riparian land which was
part of a riparian tract when ownership left the state. The
state, in appropriating such land for levee purposes, is doing
nothing inconsistent with the right it has always had. 31 For
26. The holdings in Board of Comm'rs v. Baron, 236 La. 846, 109 So. 2d 441
(1959) and Delaune v. Board of Comm'rs, 230 La. 117, 87 So. 2d 749 (1956) are
in conformity with earlier decisions of this court to the effect that not all lands,
even those in reasonable proximity to navigable streams, are subject to servitudes under article 665 merely because they are deemed necessary for use in
constructing or repairing levees. The court cites with approval Pontchartrain
R.R. v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 49 La. Ann. 570, 21 So. 765 (1897) and Koerher v. New Orleans Levee Board, 51 La. Ann. 523, 25 So. 415 (1899).
27. Hart v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 54 Fed. 559, 563 (E.D. La. 1893).
28. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 457 (1870) : "The banks of a river or stream are
understood to be that which contains it in its ordinary state of high water;
for the nature of the banks does not change, although for some cause they may
be overflowed for a time.
"Nevertheless on the borders of the Mississippi and other navigable streams,
where there are levees, established according to law, the levees shall form the
banks."
29. The court noted that the federal tribunal first found that the subject
property was originally part of a larger riparian tract and, hence, owed the
servitude even though it had become separated from the river front by the
sale of river front lots.
30. /Mayer v. Board of Comm'rs, 177 La. 1119, 150 So. 295 (1933).
31. See Ruch v. New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 275, 281, 9 So. 473, 475 (1891),
where the court said: "The right of appropriation proceeds upon the principles
• . . that the riparian owner enjoys his property sub modo, i.e., subject to the
right of the public to reserve space enough for levees, public roads, and the
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this reason the right of the state to appropriate property under
article 665 is not in contravention of due process even though
market value is not paid. This analysis also explains why only
the immediate riparian property owners, and those non-riparian
owners whose property was part of an original riparian tract,
must bow to the servitude of article 665 and why the state cannot
legally use the servitude to acquire other non-riparian property
although it is equally necessary for levee purposes. For example,
if tract A, situated two miles from the river, is necessary for
levee purposes, the owner cannot complain if his property is
appropriated under article 665 provided it was once part of a
larger tract B which was riparian at the time it left the public
domain. He has always owned this property (tract A) subject
to the servitude, even though the tract to which the servitude
originally was attached (tract B) has since been subdivided.
At the same time, the owner of tract C, situated adjacent to
tract A and also two miles from the river, will not owe the
servitude if his land was not part of a larger tract which was
riparian at the time it left the state. Although the owners of
tracts A and C are neighbors and both tracts are non-riparian,
one owes the levee servitude while the other does not. The obligation under the servitude is controlled, not by the location of
the property, but by the accident of ancient ownership. As a
result, a jig-saw effect has been produced. This arbitrary distinction is justifiable legally but not practically. Modern Louisiana no longer needs this ancient servitude, for its inequities
vastly outweigh its usefulness, 32 and the legislature should look
to the feasibility of repealing the relevant part of article 665.
The levee servitude was inherited from generations living
under different conditions from our own. Then, as now, flood
control was of paramount importance, but the methods used then
were notably different from those used today. As early as 1770
riparian landowners were obligated to construct levees themselves. Their burden was not really lightened until the end of
the Civil War,3 and all this time the levees were built on the
like. Over this space the front proprietor never acquires complete dominion.
It never passes free of this reservation by a deed to a purchaser."
32. See A. K. Roy, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 237 La. 541, 549, 111 So. 2d
765, 768 (1959), where counsel for defendant argued that "the entire jurisprudence as established under art. 665 and art. XVI, sec. 6 of the Louisiana constitution should be re-examined in the light of modern trends."
33. The obligation of building the levees shifted from the riparian owner and
his burden somewhat lightened in 1852 by the formation of the first levee dis-.
trict and the levying, in addition to revenues derived from the sale of overflowed
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river's edge. Another important difference was the former
system of landowning along rivers and streams. The riparian
tracts consisted of long, narrow strips running for miles perpendicular to the river's edge. When narrow tracts and riparian
levees were the rule, the servitude fulfilled its purpose equitably.
The levees served to protect mainly the plantation owners, 34 so
there was nothing unfair in having these proprietors shoulder
their cost. Further, since the levees were built on the river's
edge, the inequitable contrast between appropriating riparian
property while expropriating non-riparian lands for the identical
purpose never arose.
But today there exists a different situation. By 1878 it was
apparent 'that efficient and unified plans protecting the entire
state against inundation were necessary. 35 Today's larger levees
no longer hug the meanderings of the stream, and modern spillways sprawl far inland from the river. These devices perform
the purposes of the ancient riparian levee to a much higher
degree. So, too, the old riparian plantations have been sliced
into numerous individual tracts, with the result that the inequities of the servitude show themselves today. The levees no
longer protect only the riparian landowner who often owns only
a small portion of land. Why should he suffer the burden of
the levee without being fully compensated when its purpose is
the protection of every citizen? Since levees are no longer built
only adjacent to the stream, another inequity results. As the
non-riparian landowner does not owe the levee servitude5 6 a
fact made clear in the instant case, he must be paid market value
'for his property under expropriation laws. But the riparian
owner, whose lands are taken for the identical purpose, owes the
and swamp lands granted the state by Congress, of a tax to raise funds for levee
work. In 1866 all laws authorizing the construction of levees at the expense
of the riparian proprietors were repealed. La. Acts 1866, No. 20. Russell v.

Board of Comm'rs, 159 La. 330, 105 So. 361 (1925).

34. The reason for this being that inundation ordinarily would seriously
affect only riparian owners since their tracts extended so far away from the
river.
35. It was for this purpose that the Board of State Engineers, originally
created by La. Acts 1871, No. 7, was reconstituted and the duty imposed upon
it of, among other things, carefully surveying the water courses and levees to
be constructed "which are of prime importance to the state at large." La. Acts

1878 (E.S.), No. 5.
36. Unless his property. can be shown to have been riparian at the time it
left the state, and also shown to be within the reasonable necessities of the situation. Jeanerette Lumber Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 249 La. 508, 187 So. 2d
715 (1966).
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servitude of article 665 and, therefore, can only receive the
previous year's assessment value as compensation.
A repeal of the levee servitude under article 665 would not
hurt Louisiana. Any land needed for the purpose could readily
be obtained through expropriation and the added cost will not
be so great as to overshadow the good that this change would
bring about. The flood control program is for the benefit of all
the state and all taxpayers should share the burden. The cost of
other public works is distributed in an equitable manner and
flood control should be no exception.
John W. Jewell

CONSTITUTIONAL

CRIMINAL JUSTICE-BLOOD

TESTS-

DUE PROCESS

The automobile petitioner was driving skidded and struck
a tree. Suspecting that he had been drinking, police arrested
him at a hospital where he was being treated. A sample of
Schmerber's blood drawn by a physician over his objection was
used as evidence to convict him of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The United States Supreme Court
.affirmed, held,1 the privilege against self-incrimination protects
an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself
or from otherwise providing the state with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. The taking of blood was justified and under reasonable conditions, therefore petitioner's
1. Decision was 54 with Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black, Douglas,
and Fortas dissenting. The Chief Justice assigned his reasoning in Breitpaupt
v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) as the basis for his present dissent; Justices
Douglas and Fortas also cited Warren's Breithaupt dissent. Breithaupt involved
a conviction of involuntary manslaughter on evidence of intoxication supplied
by a blood sample taken from the accused while he was unconscious by a physician under medically proper conditions. Justice Douglas. felt that the true
issue was the right of privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) and that the right coincided with the fourth amendment right of
persons to be secure "in their persons." He felt that there was a clear invasion
of personal dignity and privacy in the case at hand (cf. State v. Findlay, 145
N.W.2d 650 (Iowa 1966), where the Iowa Supreme Court held that the taking
of a blood sample from an unconscious defendant was not an unreasonable
invasion of privacy and that in view of bodily assimilation of alcohol an emergency existed justifying taking the sample though defendant was not under
arrest, and that the procedure did not constitute brutality or deprive defendant
of due process of law; it was another automobile case). Justice Fortas felt that
the states have no right to commit violence upon a person, or to make use of
the results of such violence, and that the extraction of blood, over protest, was
an act of violence.

